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Corruption, Exogenous Changes in Incentives and Deterrence 
 
Summary 
In this article we apply and extend the model elaborated by Acemoglu and Verdier in 
their seminal paper (2000), to examine how the economy represented in their theoretical 
framework responds to an exogenous change in the agent's incentive. In particular, we 
focus on the consequences of a famous sentence of the Italian Supreme Court in plenary 
session, no. 500 of 1999, in which a revolutionary interpretation of civil liability rules is 
introduced, allowing private agents of our economy to appear before the court to 
demand reimbursement for the damages suffered as a consequence of illicit behavior of 
the public administration. This is one of the few cases in which the judex substantially 
makes law in a system of civil law, and the modification in incentive whether or not to 
be corrupted comes from an authority that is not part of the game (the jurisdictional 
power). Basing our affirmations on the model, we can say that corruption may have 
declined in Italy since the year 2000, as a result of a change in the incentives for both 
private agents and bureaucrats. 
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This paper comes in the wake of the literature assuming the existence of a
trade-oﬀ between government failures and market failures; before the seminal
paper by Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) this topic had rarely been formalized
(see also Shi and Temzelides, 2004). The problem of the choice between two al-
ternatives, market failure and government failure, has given rise to considerable
eﬀorts from scholars. In particular, some people see corruption as an inevitable
consequence of the government’s attempts to change the market allocation of re-
sources (Rose-Ackerman, 1978).2 We agree with this view, but the real problem
is understanding the eﬀects of corruption on the market allocation of resources.
There are at least two streams in economic literature concerning the eﬀects
of corruption on welfare and the growth of the economy. The ﬁrst is based on
the studies of Leﬀ (1964) and Huntington (1968), which emphasize the role of
bribes in simplifying exchanges in the economy and the relationships with bu-
reaucrats, that are prepared to reduce red tape for a sum of money. The second
assumes that ”legality” is a public good encouraging the achievement of maxi-
mum welfare and maximum growth rate of the economy (Shleifer and Vishny,
1993).3 Applied research shows unequivocally that the eﬀects of corruption on
economic growth are negative (Anoruo and Braha, 2005, Dreher and Herzfeld,
2005, Mauro, 1995, Mo, 2001, Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2004, Wei, 2001).4 In eco-
nomic literature there is no previous research to show how an exogenous change
of incentive for players, coming from jurisdictional power, modiﬁes the results
of the game. In particular, some research exists on the issue of corruption in
Italy, but not in the same terms as this study. Del Monte and Papagni (2001),
for example, focus on the problem of corruption in public spending in Italy.
The main motivation in writing this paper is that, as a result of a recent
decision of the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione), the responsibilities
of both the public administration as a whole and bureaucrats in particular have
increased. We assume that this modiﬁcation in the liability rules in Italy has
altered incentives in the corruption market. The interesting issue is that this
has occurred as a result of a decision made by an institution that is not part of
the game; in a way, the sentence of the Italian Supreme Court is one of the few
examples where jurisdictional power makes law in a civil law system.
The questions we have in mind in writing this paper are: has the decision no.
500, 1999, of the Italian Supreme Court reduced the incentives for bureaucrats
2On this issue Acemoglu and Verdier aﬃrm ”... corruption is often unavoidable because
governments distort the allocation of resources, and corruption is the way that the market
bypasses the regulations ... ” (Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000, p. 196).
3In general, for a survey of the economic theory of corruption, see Rose-Ackerman (1999),
while for a review of empirical literature on this issue see Dreher and Herfeld (2005).
4Starting from the results of the empiric literature supporting the hypothesis that corrup-
tion is a burden on economic growth, we can argue that corrupted economies are ineﬃcient.
A typical example could be the Latin American countries where there are high levels of both
corruption and bureaucratic ineﬃciency. From a rhetorical point of view we can just say that
if the public sector is eﬃcient there will be less incentive to corrupt someone (Clerico, 1996,
p. 67).
2to be corrupted and corruption as a whole? Has the willingness of entrepreneurs
to pay bribes been reduced as a result of this sentence? Are decisions concerning
technology, talent allocation and the government budget modiﬁed as an eﬀect
of the modiﬁcation in incentives?
Following Acemoglu and Verdier’s paper we expect the phenomenon of cor-
ruption to decrease in Italy as a result of the change in incentives for civil
servants to take bribes. In other words, the exacerbation of the liability rule
for public administration reduces both the willingness of entrepreneurs to pay
bribes and the propensity of bureaucrats to accept them. This implies that
more ﬁrms will choose good technology, more agents will decide to become en-
trepreneurs and, ﬁnally, the government budget may be reduced as a direct
consequence of the lower burden of civil servants.
In this paper we assume that the sentence no. 500, 1999 of the Italian
Supreme Court in plenary session (Corte di Cassazione, 1999) may be assimi-
lated to an exogenous event that changes the incentives among the agents con-
sidered in the theoretical model we are considering.
The mechanism of exogenous change of incentive highlighted here is abso-
lutely new because the modiﬁcation in the behavior of all the agents involved
in this game derives from an institution that does not take part in it (juridical
power). This happens as a result of the ’creative’ decision of the Italian Supreme
Court in a legal system of civil law.
To the purposes of this article we use Acemoglu and Verdier’s model (2000)
instead of that of Shi and Temzelides (2004, p. 874); the former is simpler
and ﬁts better with the limited aims of our research, while the latter is based
on a non standard assumption concerning the role of bureaucracy, that is con-
sidered as a non monopolistic supplier of some public good, but concurs with
private agents. In this manner Shi and Temzelides (2004) render endogenous
the trading patterns between bureaucrats and private agents. The analysis is
really interesting to design further actions of political economy, to introduce
into private economy close substitutes of public goods, in order to render the
market more competitive and reduce corruption; this theoretical framework is
not suitable, however, to describe the present situation in Italy, where there is
no competition in most of the public services.
Acemoglu and Verdier (2000, p. 196) found that the number of bureaucrats,
and their salaries, must be high if their activity is diﬃcult to monitor. Indeed
they showed that the relationship between per capita income and degree of
government presence is diﬃcult to monitor. In general we consider that in a
regime of corruption the prices of public products will be higher than where
illegal action does not exist, thus creating a source of market failure.5 All
scholars agree that in cases of costly or imperfect monitoring of the activity
of bureaucrats, an ’eﬃciency wage’ is necessary to avoid or limit corruption
(Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000, Stiglitz, 2000).
5Del Monte and Papagni (2001) aﬃrm: ” ... A government oﬃcial controls the oﬀer of
a service against private demand. He or she has some discretionary power on the oﬀer and
can restrict it in several ways (e.g. denying permission or delaying its release). Bribes are
the extra-price charged by bureaucrats to private customers, and arise like rents ... ”.
3In general, the fairness of public administration, together with its eﬃciency,
could be considered as a pure public good (Ellickson, 1973), but this is not true
in cases where the private agent demands permission for something (to build
a house, for example). In the latter hypothesis we are probably dealing with
a case where the public good may be factor augmenting or ﬁrm augmenting
(Del Monte and Papagni, 2001 and Cellini, 2004). This happens because in the
ﬁrst case we have generalized spill-overs, while in the second there is just one
agent that will beneﬁt by the activity of bureaucracy. This explains why private
agents are prepared to pay bribes.
The deﬁnition of corruption we have in mind is quite simple: an exchange of
money, or an attempt to perform such, between a private agent and a bureau-
crat, in order to obtain some public product or service. By this deﬁnition it is
irrelevant who starts the bargaining to conclude the corruption contract, and
just illegal payments or attempts at such can create corruption.
Departing from the common assumption for which the discretional power
of the bureaucrat is the main reason for corruption, we argue that also the
imperfect monitoring of civil service activities and the existence of monopolistic
power leave room for bribes and other illegal activities.
The theoretical framework used here is a general equilibrium model, that is
microfounded by using a multiple stage game. Acemoglu and Verdier (2000)
emphasize the opportunity cost by using people in bureaucracy that otherwise
could be productive in the private sector.
In particular, we refer to the model described in Section III of the Acemoglu
and Verdier model, in which heterogeneity among bureaucrats is allowed (p.
204). For the limited purposes of this paper we assume that the market failure
we wish to correct is relevant enough to justify the opportunity cost paid by the
economy to employ a part of its agents on inspecting entrepreneurs.
To our aims it is worth mentioning that Acemoglu and Verdier aﬃrm: ”
... We also do not allow complaints by entrepreneurs. Such complaints could
change the bargaining game between bureaucrats and entrepreneurs in the cor-
ruption stage, and would imply that bureaucrats would be able to extract less
from entrepreneurs with good technology without changing the essence of our
results ... ”. In this paper we account for the hypothesis in which private
agents may make some complaints to ask for compensation for damages, thus
introducing a little change in the theoretical framework. We conﬁne ourselves
to considering how the change in incentive inﬂuences corruption and the eﬀects
on the economy, without taking into account the problem of a non-monotonic
relationship between the optimal degree of government intervention and the per
capita income level, an issue well developed in Acemoglu and Verdier’s paper
(2000).
We account for exogenous changes in some variables only, as a consequence of
sentence no. 500, 1999 passed by the Italian Corte di Cassazione.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
it is assumed that the sentence of the Italian Supreme Court have ﬁlled a cause
of market failure, represented by an imperfect speciﬁcation of property rights
(Tietenberg, 1992) and especially of the awarding of damages. Before this deci-
sion the public administration could cause some harm to a private agent without
4having to repay in full the owner of the good, such that bureaucracy had no
incentives to stop illicit behavior and violation of the law.
By means of the theoretical framework that we use here, we may aﬃrm that
as a result of sentence no. 500, 1999 corruption in Italy would decline if the
economy really worked as in the model, but we also say that as the incentive
changes allow a reduction in the salary for civil servants, more agents will decide
to become entrepreneurs and more information about the behavior of the public
employer will be available for public administration.
The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, in the second
Section we outline the Italian legal system to make clear the problem we are
handling. In Section three, we report Acemoglu-Verdier’s model in brief, to
render this article more easy to read. In Section four, we show how the outcomes
of the model change as a result of an exogenous shock represented by sentence
no. 500, 1999 by the Italian Supreme Court. Final remarks conclude the paper.
2 Historical and Juridical Background in Italy
In Italy there is a system of civil law for which the judex are committed to the
law and can only interpret and apply it without making new rules.
The Italian Constitution, in paragraph 24, makes a distinction between two
individual juridical situations: the diritto soggettivo and the interesse legittimo.
The ﬁrst is a right fully protected by the legal system. The second is strictly
connected to the administrative provision of a civil servant and can be active
against the public administration, and until the end of the last century was
not fully protected by the Italian civil code. The main distinction between
these two individual situations is that in the second the agent cannot usually
make any claim for damages suﬀered. The interesse legittimo is an individual
situation that a private agent usually has against some public oﬃce, that may
lead to the annulment of an administrative provision or the recognition of some
right. This distinction is typical of the Italian legal system and does not ﬁnd
its counterparts in the legal systems of other countries.6 Even among Italian
scholars of public law, there is no agreement about the autonomous theoretical
relevance of the interesse legittimo (Scoca, 1988).
In particular, before the leading decision of the Italian Supreme Court in Ple-
nary session, no. 500, 1999, it was possible to ask for compensation for damages
only in cases of the violation of a right, but not for cases in which the private
agent suﬀered an illicit harm caused by bureaucracy. This is the individual
situation that we call interesse legittimo, with the exception of competition for
public supply of products, because the possibility to engage in lawsuit against
the public administration was introduced in Italy by the Law no. 142 of 19
February 1992, under the pressure of the European Community. Think, for ex-
ample, of the case of a private agent who makes an instance to a public oﬃce to
obtain the authorization to build a house. If the agent does not get any answer
after the time ﬁxed by the law, she or he should begin a proceeding against the
6Only the Spanish Constitution considers the interesse legittimo in paragraph 24.
5public administration to establish her or his own right to build the house, but
cannot ask for any compensation for damages, because the individual situation
is qualiﬁable as ’interesse legittimo’only and not as a right. Before the historic
decision of the Italian Supreme Court no. 500, 1999, that extended the regime
of full protection even in cases of individual situations that are conﬁgured as in-
teresse legittimo, there was more room for corruption. The reasons are simple.
With regard to the relationships between the government and its bureaucrats, if
there is no possibility to go behind the court to safeguard the individual juridi-
cal position it is more diﬃcult for the principal (public administration) to know
about the misdeeds of public servants, because no legal act will be notiﬁed to the
authorities. The possibility for the principal to discover that its bureaucrats are
asking for bribes consists uniquely in the costly eﬀort of monitoring the activi-
ties of civil servants. On the other hand, the risk for the bureaucrat is restricted
to the possibility of losing his job, but there is no additional civil liability. From
the point of view of the relationship between private agents and civil servants,
if the ﬁrst cannot demand a refund of the damages she or he has suﬀered, the
agent has to corrupt a civil servant if he or she wishes to obtain something from
the public administration. Under this condition bureaucrats have an enormous
bargaining power against private agents in the bribes market.
T h eh i s t o r i cd e c i s i o no ft h eCorte di Cassazione changed the application
of general liability rules in the Italian legal system, so that now also interessi
legittimi have full protection. This leads to a change in incentives and informa-
tion among the parts involved in the three-agent multiple-stage game described
here, because the possibility for private agents to appear before the court to
demand damages suﬀered is an additional indication for the public authority
that something is not working very well with its employees. This increases the
probability that the corrupted civil servant will be detected and ﬁred. If the
public administration has to pay for the damages claimed by the private agent,
and may ask the bureaucrat to refund the sum, this decision greatly widens
the liability area of civil servants. This mechanism must necessarily make the
bureaucrat less prepared to take bribes for fear of losing his or her job.
The possibility for a private agent to take legal steps against the public
administration in cases of violation of interesse legittimo could have reduced
the willingness to pay bribes to obtain concessions or accelerate the procedure
for obtaining them, thus increasing the opportunity cost of using a criminal
behavior to corrupt bureaucrats.
It is worth mentioning that the sentence of the Corte di Cassazione does not
change the area of criminal responsibility for private agents and bureaucrats;
from the point of view of criminal law nothing has changed. The mechanism
by means of which a civil servant could be made to pay the damages caused
during his activity is as follows. The private agent proceeds against the pub-
lic administration in which the bureaucrat is engaged. In the hypothesis that
a public authority is condemned to refund the damages suﬀered by a private
agent as a direct consequence of the illicit behavior of its public servant, there
are two possibilities. The public administration may either sue for damages
in a criminal prosecution against its bureaucrat or inform the Corte dei Conti
6(Fiscal Court)7 to proceed for treasury damages. This is the so-called ”double
track system”: obviously this implies that the corrupted bureaucrat will never
be convicted to pay more than all the damages created against the public ad-
ministration (Longavita, 2004). The justiﬁcation for treasury damages in Italy
is gross negligence or fraudulent behavior by the bureaucrat.
The economic mechanism we suppose to work depends in a crucial way on
the probability that the guilty will be discovered and punished. If the changes
in incentive introduced by decision no. 500/1999 really work we must surely
observe a reduction in corruption cases in Italy, beginning from 2000.
3 The Acemoglu-Verdier model
First of all we report three essential assumptions constituting the basis of the
theoretical model employed in this paper: ”1. Government intervention requires
the use of agents (”bureaucrats” for short) to collect information, make deci-
sions, and implement policies; 2. These bureaucrats are self-interested, and by
virtue of their superior information, hard to monitor perfectly; 3. There is some
heterogeneity among bureaucrats.” (Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000, p. 194). Their
signiﬁcance is straightforward, and well illustrated in Acemoglu and Verdier’s
paper (2000). In what follows it will become clear why we highlight those con-
ditions.
3.1 The Basic Model
To make this work easy to read, we now report in synthesis the basic structure
of Acemoglu-Verdier’s model (2000).8 For the sake of simplicity we also use
the same notation for variables. A static economy is presented, consisting of
a continuum of risk-neutral agents with mass one. Initially it is assumed that
all the agents are homogeneous. They can choose to become entrepreneurs, or
if there is a government they can become government employees (bureaucrats).
Those who decide to be entrepreneurs may choose to implement a ”bad” tech-
nology or a ”good” one; both generate the same amount of output y, but the
clean technology has a cost e,w h e r e0<e<y , while the ”bad” technology is
costless. The so-called ”good” technology ensures a positive externality. Let n
be the mass of entrepreneurs in the economy considered, and x ≤ n be the mass
of entrepreneurs choosing the good technology.
We assume that there is a positive non-pecuniary eﬀect on the payoﬀ of
all agents equal to βx,w h e r eβ>e(i.e. the positive externality more than
oﬀsets the private cost of implementing the ”good” technology). Under those
7The Corte dei Conti is a special jurisdictional authority that judiﬁes in cases of treasury
damages.
8From the point of view of the author of this paper it can be easy to refer simply to the
model of Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), thus we report their model just to render as straight-
forward as possible the reading of this paper, but without the intention of appropriating to
ourselves the paternity of the original contribution.
7conditions maximum taxes are independent of technology choices, but do not
in outcomes. The payoﬀs for both activities are
(1)
πg = y + β · x − e
πb = y + β · x .
where πg is the proﬁt of entrepreneurs that employ the ’good’ technology and
πg is the revenue of the ﬁrms that use the ’bad’ technology. To the purposes of
this paper we may ignore the Laissez-Faire equilibrium (Acemoglu and Verdier,
2000, p. 197) to deal with the case of optimal regulation without corruption.
We have just to report that under the stipulated assumptions all the ﬁrms will
choose the ’bad’ technology (i.e. n =1a n dx = 0), generating a negative
externality, such as to create room for the economic policy to increase welfare.
3.2 Optimal Regulation Without Corruption
It is assumed in the paper that the government’s objective function is only to
maximize social welfare, and to this aim it attempts to regulate the choice of en-
trepreneurs concerning the technology to implement. The crucial assumption is
that the technology choice is not publicly observable, so that the government has
to employ some agents as bureaucrats to inspect ﬁrms. Indeed, it is considered
that each bureaucrat may inspect just one entrepreneur. In the simplest version
of the model it is assumed that there is no corruption and bureaucrats always
report truthfully. Under those conditions, there will be a fraction of agents that
will be bureaucrats, randomly controlling the technology implemented by ﬁrms,
the opportunity cost of subtracting agents from the private sector of the econ-
omy is low, and there will be limited liability and constraints. The Government
budget constraint determines the subsidies that can be given in favor of those
entrepreneurs who implement the ”good” technology.
In this multiple-stage game we assume to have three diﬀerent kinds of play-
ers. The public administration and the private agents, that may choose, in the
presence of public intervention, to be entrepreneurs or become bureaucrats. τ
represents the tax that an entrepreneur should pay if a ”bad” technology is
implemented, while s is the subsidy that a ﬁrm receives for using the good
technology. w is the wage received by bureaucrats. The probability that an
entrepreneur may be inspected is p(n)={(1 − n/n),1} which is the fraction
of bureaucrats (1 − n) divided by the fraction of entrepreneurs n. The timing
of events is the same as in Acemoglu and Verdier model’s (2000, p. 198). The
government wishes to maximize the net surplus SS
(2) SS = n · y +( β − e)x,
by choosing n,x,w,τ and s, under four constraints.
First, there is a limited liability constraint for which the government cannot
tax more than the revenue of the ﬁrm
(3) τ ≤ y.
Second, the payoﬀ of entrepreneurs is the same regardless of the technology
they choose. The expected payoﬀs are: πg = y + β · x − e + p(n) · s for good
8technology, and πb = y + β · x − p(n) · τ for bad technology. The authors of
the paper we are referring aﬃrm that the number of entrepreneurs should be
n ≥ 1/2. The reason is that for n<1/2 we ﬁnd that the probability of an
inspection is greater than 1, and this does not make sense (i.e. p(n)f o rn<1/2
is p(n = .4) = (1 − .4)/.4=1 .5 ) .T h i si m p l i e st h a tn ≥ 1/2.
Making equal πg = πb after simpliﬁcation and dividing both members by
p(n), we obtain




that we denominate technology constraint (i.e. πg ≥ πb). This constraint
ensures that all the agents choose the good technology.
The government cannot commit its citizens to becoming bureaucrats; in this
way the rational agents, that are all risk-neutral, choose to be civil servants if
their payoﬀ is greater than or at the least equal to the entrepreneurs’, w+β·x ≥
πg,o r




This result comes from substituting by πg and simplifying. This is the so-
called talent allocation constraint.
The last constraint is related to the balance in the public sector. The gov-
ernment has to pay salaries to (1−n)·w for n ≥ 1/2 and it distributes subsidies
equal to (1 − n)· x/n · s. On the other hand the government also collects taxes











This result comes from considering that the government expenses are
(1−n)·w+(1−n)· x/n·s and the revenues are (1−n)·(1−x/n)·τ. Dividing
both members by (1 − n), the result proves to hold. We can see that equation
(3) should hold as an equality, otherwise, τ and n could be increased without
violating (4), (5), or (6). The technology choice has to hold as an equality for
the same reason. In this way, after some algebra, by using (3) and (4) and
substituting in (5), we get a simpliﬁed form of the allocation of talent:
(5 ) w ≥ y −
1 − n
n
· y, for n ≥ 1/2.
If this inequality did not hold, the public-sector wage rate would be too low
to attract agents, and we would have n = 1. Finally, rearranging (6) and using
(4), we get a simpliﬁed form of government budget constraint:
(6 ) y ≥ w + x/(1 − n) · e.
Combining (5 )a n d( 6  ), and noting that x, the mass of entrepreneurs choos-
ing the good technology, cannot be greater than n, we obtain the constraint set
of the government as













/n · e and multiplying both members for n and
after some little algebra we ﬁnd






It is worth reporting that for x =0a n dn = 1 the social surplus is SSng = y.
Instead, for ˆ n between 1









without corruption and if
(9) β>
√
y · e + e,
is satisﬁed, the optimal allocation of resources has n = x =ˆ n given by (8).
Otherwise, the optimal allocation is the laissez-faire.I f t h e SSg prevails we
obtain that the majority of entrepreneurs will employ the ’good’ technology,
but the intervention of the policy maker is justiﬁable, in terms of β,o n l yi f
the market failure is strong enough compared to y. This is because the market
intervention of the social planner withdraws some agents from the private sector
of the economy (see Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000, p. 199 for more details).
3.3 Optimal Regulation with Corruption
In this section we modify the previous theoretical framework to allow for the
corruptibility of civil servants. A bureaucrat may use the information advantage
she or he has over her or his principal (the government), and thus create room for
bribes, by reporting untruthfully. The maximum ”surplus” that a bureaucrat
can extract is s + τ. We assume that in both cases the bureaucrat can get
a proportion 0 <σ≤ 1 of this amount as a bribe. The probability for a
bureaucrat to be caught is q.9 If the bureaucrat is caught taking bribes he loses
all his income.
Note that (1−q) is a measure of the informational advantage of bureaucrats,
where for q = 0 corrupted bureaucrats are never caught and for q = 1 corrupted
bureaucrats will immediately be detected.
Because all bureaucrats are homogenous, there will be an unique condition
determining whether it pays to be corrupt. If honest, a bureaucrat obtains w.
If corrupt, he loses everything with probability q, and with probability 1−q,h e











· σ · e,
if it is violated, all the bureaucrats become corrupt. In this case, all the
entrepreneurs receive σ · (τ + s), regardless of the technology choice made by
9See footnote number 6 on page 200 of Acemoglu and Verdier’s paper (2000), in which the
exogenous nature of q is highlighted.
10entrepreneurs, such that the government intervention is unequivocally wasteful.
It is worth noting that there is an inverse relationship between w and q (∂w/∂q <
0). This means that it is possible to reduce the salary paid to bureaucrats
without increasing the corruption phenomena, thereby releasing resources for
alternative use.
If (10) holds, there will be no corruption. Thus using (10) and the govern-















Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) show that if (11) is more restrictive than (7),
to prevent corruption it will be necessary to pay the bureaucrats a wage higher
than its present level to attract agents towards bureaucracy, in other words a
rent. The best intervention policy may take one of these three forms:
(i) (11) is less restrictive than (7), such that n = x =ˆ n>1
2 as in (8);
(ii) (7) is less restrictive than (11), so n = x = nc > 1
2 where nc is given
by imposing n = x in (7);
(12) nc ≡
y
y + e +
1 − q
q
· σ · e
.
(iii) n = 1
2 and x is chosen so as to balance (11), thus
















In hypothesis (iii) the government revenues decrease a little in order to sub-
sidize the ﬁrms that implement the ’good’ technology, so that the only way to
raise the revenues is for some entrepreneurs to choose the bad technology and
pay τ = y.
3.4 Heterogeneity and Equilibrium Corruption
Now it is assumed that after an agent becomes a bureaucrat he will discover
whether or not to take bribes. He or she knows that before deciding to become
a civil servant, we have a case of adverse selection (Besley and McLaren, 1993).
The dishonest bureaucrats that are able to take bribes will be discovered with
probability ˆ q ≥ 0, while those that are honest or not particularly proﬁcient at
corruption will be caught with probability q>ˆ q. The crucial point in this
version of the model is that there is some heterogeneity among bureaucrats in
the propensity to take bribes. The probability that an agent will be prepared
to take bribes is m. Now the timing of events is:
1. The government announces the public wage w,t h et a xτ, the subsidy
s, and the maximum number of bureaucrats it will hire (1 − n).
2. The agents choose their professions. If there are more applicants to
the government sector than 1−n,t h e n1−n of them are chosen randomly and
the remainder enter in the private sector.
113. Those who enter the private sector choose a technology. Their choice
of technology is at this stage non observable by any other agent.
3.1 Each bureaucrat discovers if she or he is good at taking bribes or
not, and then decides to whether to demand a bribe.
4. Each bureaucrat randomly inspects one entrepreneur and discovers
whether she or he has chosen the good or the bad technology.
5. Each bureaucrat than reports on the technology choice of the en-
trepreneur she or he has inspected. If his report is ’good’ the entrepreneur
receives the subsidy s. If the report is ’bad’, than the entrepreneur pays the tax
τ.
In cases with heterogeneity in the propensity to accept bribes among bu-
reaucrats there are three diﬀerent possible solutions.
First, there is no government regulation (i.e. Laissez Fair equilibrium) n =1
and x =0 .
Second, there is no corruption and the solution in the previous section in
Acemoglu and Verdier’s paper applies, with ˆ q that substitutes q (and n = x ≥
1/2o rn =1 /2a n dx<1/2, in this case w ≥ (1 − ˆ q) · σ · (τ + s)/ˆ q, so neither
”honest” nor ”dishonest” bureaucrats accept bribes). The social surplus of this
allocation is SSnc (see Proposition 2, in Acemoglu and Verdier’s model).
Third, there is the possibility of intervention with partial corruption, that
is the topic of this section. In this allocation there are enough suﬃcient rents
so that the ’honest bureaucrats’ do not become corrupted, but a fraction m
will accept bribes (the ’dishonest’). Under this new assumption the technology
choice constraint is







What is changed here with respect to Sections I and II is that the en-
trepreneur will be inspected and receive subsidy with probability (1 − n)·(1 − m)/n.
Even in this hypothesis, if an entrepreneur and a civil servant are discovered to
exchange money for a public service in an illicit way, the revenue of the private
agent will be conﬁscated regardless of the technology choice.














While the budget constraint with partial corruption is diﬀerent as well, be-
cause some civil servants are caught to taking bribes and their returns are con-
ﬁscated:
(16) (1 − n) · w +( 1− n)(1− m) ·
x
n
· s +( 1− n) · m(1 − ˆ q)·







As in the previous versions of the model, the bureaucrat earns w, the honest
fraction 1 − m pay out a subsidy x/n, and the dishonest civil servants, ex-
cept the fraction ˆ q that are caught, pay a subsidy with probability 1 (if the
technology is bad, he claims it is good and takes the subsidy). The wage of
12corrupted bureaucrats will be not paid for the proportion ˆ q of (1 − n) · m that
will be caught, and full taxes will be collected from the entrepreneurs involved
in criminal exchanges with civil servants. Finally, the (1 − n) · (1 − m)h o n e s t
bureaucrats detect entrepreneurs with bad technology with probability 1−x/n.
Under an assumption of partial corruption, the talent constraint is







· m · (1 − ˆ q) · (1 − σ) · (τ + s).
It is diﬀerent from (5) for two reasons. The agents understand that if they
decide to be employed in government service, with probability m they will be
good at taking bribes, and thus make more than w. They also realize that
if they become entrepreneurs, they will have to deal with corrupt bureaucrats
(this is the third term of the right-side of (17)). Now assuming σ =1 ,a n d
combining from (15), (16) and (17), we may deﬁne the constraint set for partial
corruption constraints
(18) x ≤ min




















and n ≥ 1
2. Reporting Acemoglu and Verdier’s results, we may observe
that (18), has three terms. The ﬁrst require nothing other than x ≤ n.T h e
second aﬃrms that the 1−m bureaucrats who are honest do not accept bribes.
Finally, the last ensures that agents are willing to apply to bureaucracy. Let
A ≡ A(ˆ q,m,q) ≡ m/(1 − m)·(1 − ˆ q)+(1− q)/q·1/(1 − m) ·(1 − m · ˆ q). The
main results of the model with partial corruption are summarized in Proposition
3 of Acemoglu and Verdier’s paper (2000).
4 Application of the Theoretical Framework to
Study the Eﬀects of Sentence no. 500 / 1999
of the Italian Supreme Court on Corruption
After reporting the basic framework which we use in this paper, it is possible
to start to show how it is useful to explain what is happening in Italy since
the revolutionary sentence no. 500 / 1999 of the Italian Supreme Court, with
regard to corruption.
4.1 The example
First of all we have to say that in their paper Acemoglu and Verdier supply, as
an example, the negative externality of pollution and the regulation of public
authorities in the choice of ﬁrms whether or not to adopt the clean technol-
ogy (for the same example see Shi and Temzelides, 2004, p. 874). Here we
13refer to a diﬀerent case regarding the ediﬁcation activity that the people can
make by respecting the planning legislation (i.e. ’good technology’ in our ex-
ample), thus creating a non-pecuniary positive externality, or by violating the
town planning scheme (i.e. ’bad technology’ in our application), in the attempt
to maximize private proﬁt to the detriment of social welfare, thus creating a
negative externality. In the ﬁrst case, the positive eﬀect is a good organization
of the territory, with nice houses, wide streets and space for people to meet.
In the second case we have the opposite. Without some public intervention all
the building ﬁrms will choose the bad technology as in the typical situation of
’prisoner dilemma’, with the consequent creation of negative externality. This
could be a nice example of market failure, with the risk, in the presence of public
intervention, of obtaining a worse situation that, as in Acemoglu and Verdier’s
model, may leave room for corruption. In our paper the bureaucrats’inspec-
tion is necessary to see if entrepreneurs are building according to the planning
legislation, or if they are employing a ’bad technology’, thus creating a negative
externality. For the purpose of our research it is not important to know whether
the entrepreneurs have regular planning permission or if they got this licence in
a regime of silence-approval. In the ﬁrst case the inspection of bureaucrats is
preventive: this means that before the concession of planning permission it is
impossible for entrepreneurs to start construction. In the latter hypothesis the
checking by bureaucrats could be both preventive and successive, to verify if
the private agent spoke the truth in the statement of conformity of the building
to the town planning scheme.
4.2 The Variable of the Game Changed as a Result of
Sentence no. 500 / 1999 of the Italian Supreme Court
In section two we have described why we assume that the incentive for players
in the game described in Acemoglu and Verdier’s model has been changed as
a result of the decision of the Corte di Cassazione we are examining in this
article. Now we will explain in more detail which parameters have been changed
by sentence no. 500 / 1999. They are: σ the proportion of ’surplus’, (s + τ),
that the bureaucrats may ask for bribes; q the probability that a corrupted
bureaucrat will get caught; ˆ q the probability that a ”dishonest” bureaucrat,
that is good at taking bribes, will get caught (with ˆ q ≥ 0); ﬁnally m is the
fraction of civil servants who are prepared to exchange public goods for money
(note that ˆ q and m only regard the version of the model with partial corruption).
In our application, before the change of incentives for the players in the
game, the bureaucrat might delay the release of planning permission without
having to fear some legal action from the entrepreneurs, thus she or he could
exert a strong bargaining power in demanding bribes and in the amount of
surplus she or he might extract. On the other hand, the private agent could
not ﬁle a lawsuit against the public administration, because of the imperfect
speciﬁcation of the property rights (could not claim for damages), thus his
bargaining power was lower and she or he probably preferred to pay some money
to obtain the public authorization he needed or wait for an indeﬁnite period
14of time. After the seminal sentence we are considering, the entrepreneur to
whom a bureaucrat denies or delays without reason the release of some public
permission or authorization, may proceed against the public administration to
ask for a refund of the damages she or he has suﬀered, as well as the release of
the administrative provision she or he originally requested. As we have seen, if
the public administration loses its case to an entrepreneur suing for violation of
interessi legittimi, it may recover the amount of money paid from the bureaucrat,
on condition that the latter has gross responsibility or has used a fraudulent
behavior. This means that, in the bribe market, the bargaining power of the
civil servant is reduced and private agents will be less willing to make illicit
payments to obtain some public good or service (i.e. σ ↓).
After sentence no. 500 / 1999 of the Italian Corte di Cassazione the like-
lihood that a corrupt bureaucrat will be caught has increased; this happens
essentially because in attempts to corrupt, if the entrepreneur decides to sue
the public administration where the corrupt bureaucrat is employed, demand-
ing a refund of the damage he or she has suﬀered as a result of delay or illicit
denial of some public authorization or permission, the public administration
may discover, by means of the service of the statement of claim, that something
does not work very well. In other words the service of petition by entrepreneurs
increases the information available to the public administration about the be-
havior of employees (i.e. q ↑). Obviously, this does not mean that each lawsuit
for violation of interessi legittimi hides an attempt to corruption by the civil
servant, but it is a signal that there is some problem. Note that in Italy in the
last ﬁve years, since sentence no. 500 / 1999, lawsuits against the public admin-
istration for violation of interessi legittimi have grown exponentially (Presidenti
T.A.R. Relazioni Inaugurali Anno Giudiziario, 2005).
Finally, the fraction of civil servants who are prepared to exchange public
goods for money has become lower, because the full protection of the juridical
situation of interesse legittimo legitimates entrepreneurs to ﬁle a lawsuit against
the public administration, since the historic sentence no. 500 /1999of the Italian
Supreme Court has increased the liability rule for civil servants. This means
that the corrupted bureaucrat, apart from losing his job (as in Acemoglu and
Verdier’s model), might be also condemned to refund the public administration
for damages through violation of interessi legittimi (i.e. m ↓).
After the description of the variable that we assume changed and the descrip-
tion of the directions in which we assume they work, we may apply Acemoglu
and Verdier’s model to the problem we are handling.
4.3 The Application of the Model
To the aims of this paper we may distinguish two diﬀerent kinds of relation-
ship. The ﬁrst is between bureaucrats and entrepreneurs. In the absence of an
eﬃciency wage and without corruption, the ineﬃciency of the public adminis-
tration constitutes a negative externality for entrepreneurs. In the absence of
an eﬃciency wage, but with corruption, there is room for bribing. In particular,
the greater the magnitude of the deal involved, the greater will be the willing-
15ness of entrepreneurs to pay bribes (in particular in the area of private and
public building, as in the case of sentence no. 500 / 1999). Here we are dealing
with a case of strategic interdependence between these two players. This eﬀect
is captured by σ. The second relationship is between the public administration
and the bureaucrat (principal- agent theory), where the sentence has increased
both the information about the behavior of civil servants and the liability rule
for bureaucrats. These eﬀects are expressed by q and m respectively. It is worth
noting that even in the version of the model which allows for partial corruption,
the ﬁnal eﬀects on m of the increased liability rule for bureaucrats, as a con-
sequence of sentence no. 500 / 1999, is in the direction of reducing its value,
because for civil servants that are prepared to take bribes they see the oppor-
tunity cost of being corrupted as higher than before, such that the ﬁnal eﬀect
is that m decreases. In what follows we just refer to the versions of the model
which allow for corruption.
4.3.1 Homogeneity among bureaucrats
Here we apply Acemoglu and Verdier’s model as shown in subsection 3.3 of
this paper. Under ceteris paribus conditions, we can do some simple exercises
of comparative statics. We start taking into account the eﬀects of a reduction
of σ.G i v e n t h a t ∂w/∂σ > 0, we may aﬃrm that a decrease in σ implies a
fall in the corruption constraint in (10). This means that the wage level w to
avoid corruption will be lower if the power of bureaucrats in demanding bribes
is reduced. Accounting for the number of entrepreneurs choosing the ’good’
technology as in (11) and taking the partial derivative of x with respect to σ
(∂x/∂σ < 0), we can see that decreasing the amount of ’surplus’ the bureaucrat
may extract in the form of bribes, the number of entrepreneurs implementing
the ’good’ technology increases. Even the overall number of private agents that
decide to become entrepreneurs nc , under the assumption of public intervention
in the economy and corruption, rises if the power of civil servants to ask for
bribes is reduced. In fact, taking the ﬁrst partial derivative of nc with respect
to σ, in (12) we get ∂nc/∂σ < 0. In the same manner we may proceed to study
the eﬀects of an increase in the probability for bureaucrats to be caught. From
(10) it is immediately clear that ∂w/∂q < 0; this means that if it is easier to
detect corrupt bureaucrats, the public authority will see its corruption constraint
reduced. We may also consider the eﬀects of a reduction in q with respect to
x (∂x/∂q > 0). When q increases this implies that more entrepreneurs will
choose the good technology. Finally, using (12), for ∂nc/∂q > 0, if it is easier
for corrupt bureaucrats to be caught, this implies that more private agents will
choose to be entrepreneurs and fewer will be bureaucrats.
4.3.2 Heterogeneity among bureaucrats
Now we make use of the theoretical framework outlined in subsection 3.4. We
start by analyzing the eﬀects of a change in the amount of bribes that the
dishonest bureaucrat may extract from surplus. From (15), that describes the
16partial corruption constraint, and knowing ∂w/∂σ > 0, it is possible to aﬃrm
that, as in the version of the model previously presented, if σ decreases this
implies that the rent for public bureaucrats to avoid the corruption phenomenon
will also diminish. With regard to the talent allocation constraint represented in
(17) we know that ∂x/∂σ > 0 such that if the fraction of surplus, (τ + s), that
the civil servant may extract is reduced, this implies that more private agents
will decide to become entreprenuers also in this version of the model.
Because the eﬀects of an increase in q are the same as in the previous subsec-
tion, here we investigate just how a rise in ˆ q will change the result of the model.
To investigate how a change in the probability that a ’dishonest’ public servant
will be caught taking bribes will alter the number of entrepreneurs that will im-
plement the ’good’ technology, we can start from (16); for ∂x/∂ˆ q>0, we may
conclude that an increase of ˆ q determines that more and more entrepreneurs
will employ the ’good’ technology. Equation (17) is useful to study how the
talent allocation constraint is aﬀected by a change in ˆ q, By taking the implicit
partial derivative of mass of entrepreneurs choosing the ’good’ technology with
respect to ˆ q (∂x/∂ˆ q>0).
By using (14) and taking the partial derivative of surplus, τ + s ,w i t hr e -
spect to m (∂ (τ + s)/∂m > 0) we can see that a fall in the probability that the
bureaucrats are prepared to take bribes increases the surplus. Equation (15) is
informative about the eﬀects of a change in m with respect to the corruption
constraint. In this case there is a positive relationship between those two vari-
ables (∂w/∂m > 0). Thus a decrease in the capability or propensity of dishonest
bureaucrats in taking bribes also decrease the so called ’corruption constraint’
represented by w.
Regarding the eﬀects on x, and seeing from (16) that ∂x/∂m < 0, we may
aﬃrm that a reduction in the probability that a bureaucrat is prepared to take
bribes raises the number of entrepreneurs that will choose the ’good’ technology.
5F i n a l R e m a r k s
We agree with Acemoglu and Verdier’s conclusions for which the partial corrup-
tion equilibrium is better than the case in which corruption is not allowed for;
in our application we conﬁrm the main result of the theoretical framework, for
which an increase of information to the government about the behavior of its
bureaucrats, a decrease in bargaining power of bureaucrats in asking for bribes,
and a reduction of the propensity of civil servants to be ’dishonest’, may reduce:
a) the number of agents withdrawing from the private sector; b) the eﬃciency
wages paid to bureaucrats; c) the overall corruption phenomenon.
Thus it is conﬁrmed that the choice is not between the laissez fair equilib-
rium with market failures and policy intervention with government failure, but
in which cases the beneﬁt of economic policy more than outweighed the damage
of public intervention.
We think that it may be interesting to study the possibility of diﬀerentiating
taxes for private agents as a function of the delay in the answer from the public
17administration. A more rapid answer from the public administration could
imply higher taxes for private agents. In other words, this seems to be an
application of the eﬃciency wage theory from the point of view of bureaucrats,
and a mechanism of revealed preferences from the standpoint of the private
agent.
The conclusions of the paper are perfectly consistent with Italian legislation
in the area of wage payment to bureaucrats. We have seen that to avoid or
limit corruption we have to pay a rent to civil servants, or, in other words,
we have to pay them following the eﬃciency wage criteria. A similar system
of labor remuneration was implemented in Italy In the ’nineties, but probably
some more eﬀort is necessary (Petretto, 1998).
From the point of view of welfare, the ﬁrst-best is equilibrium with the in-
tervention of the state and no corruption. If we extend the model to account
for the possibility that civil servants take bribes, the partial corruption equilib-
rium is better than the full corruption equilibrium. In other words, if the illicit
behavior of government employees is not so consistent, it is not worth spending
so many resources on eliminating this phenomenon.
Corruption is seen as an unavoidable evil related to the intervention of the
state in the economy to correct the causes of market failure, but these negative
eﬀects are acceptable if they are more than outweighed by the positive ones.
The crucial point in the real function of the mechanism we have outlined
in this model is the eﬀectiveness of the checks by the Corte dei Conti and the
extension of the liability rule for public servants.
In terms of political economic measures we can imagine rendering compet-
itive the market of inspection of some public good, assuming that the market
may supply strict substitutes of public goods (Shi and Temzelides, 2004). In
other words we are in front of a dichotomous choice. To maintain monopolistic
power in the supply of a public product, thus trusting in the power of public
intervention in the economy and accepting some level of corruption as an in-
evitable by-product of public regulation, as in Acemoglu and Verdier (2000).
Or we may imagine creating some products that are close or perfect substitutes
of that provided by public administration, thus avoiding the problem related to
public intervention failure and stimulating competition in the supply of public
services (Shi and Temzelides, 2004). Another measure to limit corruption is
to reduce the monopolistic power of each bureaucrat, to provide for a substi-
tute decision from another authority. Regarding the corruption phenomenon
as a whole, using the indicators of Transparency International, we may aﬃrm
that corruption has declined in Italian starting from 2000, but to prove that
this result is a direct consequence of the mechanism outlined in this paper it is
necessary to do some more research.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to participants at the seminars held at University of Catania, for
their invaluable suggestions and comments on a previous draft of this paper.
All remaining errors are the responsibility of the author.
18References
Acemoglu, Daron and Thierry Verdier. 2000. ”The Choice Between Market
Failures and Corruption.” The American Economic Review 90(1):194-211.
Anoruo, Emmanuel and Habtu Braha. 2005. ”Corruption and Economic
Growth: The African Experience.” mimeo.
Besley, Timothy and John Mclaren. 1993. ”Taxes and Bribery: The Role of
Wage Incentives.” Economic Journal 103(416):119-141
Cellini, Roberto. 2004. Politica economica. Introduzione ai modelli fonda-
mentali. McGraw-Hill, Milano.
Clerico, Giuseppe. 1996. ”Incentivi e sanzioni per combattere la corruzione
del burocrate pubblico.” Economia Pubblica 26(3):55-80.
Corte di Cassazione. 1999. ”Sentence no. 500 of July 22, 1999.” in Giustizia
Civile 49(9):2261-2282.
Del Monte Alfredo and Erasmo Papagni. 2001. ”Public expenditure, cor-
ruption and economic growth: the case of Italy.” European Journal of Political
Economy 17(1):1-16.
Dreher, Axel and Thomas Herzfeld. 2005. ”The Economic Costs of Corrup-
tion: A Survey and New Evidence.” mimeo.
Ellickson, Bryan. 1973. ”A Generalization of the Pure Theory of Public
Goods.” The American Economic Review 63(3):417-432.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies.N e w
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Leﬀ, Nathaniel. 1964. ”Economic Development through Bureacratic Cor-
ruption.” American Behavioral Scientist:8-12.
Longalavita, Fulvio. 2004. ”L’esclusivit` a della giurisdizione erariale e l’azione
civile di danno in sede penale.” Amministrazione e contabilit` a dello stato e degli
enti pubblici 5/6:634-640.
Mauro, Paolo. 1995. ”Corruption and Growth.” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 110(3):681-712.
Mo, Pak Hung. 2001. ”Corruption and Economic Growth.” Journal of
Comparative Economics 29(1):66-79.
Pellegrini, Lorenzo and Reyer Gerlagh. 2004. ”Corruption’s Eﬀect on
Growth and Its Transmission Channels.” Kyklos 57(3):429-456.
Petretto, Alessandro. 1998. ”Riforma della Pubblica Amministrazione, ri-
forma del bilancio ed eﬃcienza economica.” Le Regioni XXVI(5):1161-1172.
Relazioni annuali dei Presidenti dei Tribunali Amministrativi Regionali resi
in occasione dell’apertura degli anni giudiziari. Various issues (see www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it)
Rose-Ackerman, S. 1978. Corruption: A study in political economy.N e w
York, USA: Academic Press.
Rose-Ackerman, S. 1999. Corruption and Government: Causes, Conse-
quences, and Reform. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Scoca, Franco Gaetano. 1988. ”Interessi protetti (dir. amm.)” in Enciclo-
pedia Giuridica (Treccani), Roma: Istituto Enciclopedico Italiano.
19Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny. 1993. ”Corruption.” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 119(3):599-617.
Shi, Shouyong and Theodosios Temzelides. 2004. ”A Model of Bureaucracy
and Corruption.” International Economic Review 45(3):873-908.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2000. Economics of the Public Sector. Thrid Edition.
New York, USA: W.W. Norton & Company.
Tietenberg, Tom. 1992. Environmental and Natural Resource Economics,
New York, HarperCollins Publishers.
Wei, Shang-Jin. 2001. ”Corruption in Economic Development: Grease or
Sand?” Economic Survey of Europe, Geneva: United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Europe.
20 
NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 










NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2006 
    
SIEV 1.2006  Anna ALBERINI: Determinants and Effects on Property Values of Participation in Voluntary Cleanup Programs: 
The Case of Colorado 
CCMP 2.2006  Valentina BOSETTI, Carlo CARRARO and Marzio GALEOTTI:  Stabilisation Targets, Technical Change and the 
Macroeconomic Costs of Climate Change Control 
CCMP 3.2006  Roberto ROSON: Introducing Imperfect Competition in CGE Models: Technical Aspects and Implications 
KTHC 4.2006  Sergio VERGALLI: The Role of Community in Migration Dynamics 
SIEV 5.2006  Fabio GRAZI, Jeroen C.J.M. van den BERGH and Piet RIETVELD: Modeling Spatial Sustainability: Spatial 
Welfare Economics versus Ecological Footprint 
CCMP 6.2006  Olivier DESCHENES and Michael GREENSTONE: The Economic Impacts of Climate Change: Evidence from 
Agricultural Profits and Random Fluctuations in Weather 
PRCG 7.2006  Michele MORETTO and Paola VALBONESE: Firm Regulation and Profit-Sharing: A Real Option Approach 
SIEV 8.2006  Anna ALBERINI and Aline CHIABAI: Discount Rates in Risk v. Money and Money v. Money Tradeoffs 
CTN 9.2006  Jon X. EGUIA: United We Vote 
CTN 10.2006  Shao CHIN SUNG and Dinko DIMITRO: A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games 
NRM 11.2006  Fabio CERINA (lxxviii): Tourism Specialization and Sustainability: A Long-Run Policy Analysis 
NRM 12.2006  Valentina BOSETTI, Mariaester CASSINELLI and Alessandro LANZA (lxxviii): Benchmarking in Tourism 
Destination, Keeping in Mind the Sustainable Paradigm 
CCMP 13.2006  Jens HORBACH: Determinants of Environmental Innovation – New Evidence from German Panel Data Sources
KTHC 14.2006  Fabio SABATINI:  Social Capital, Public Spending and the Quality of Economic Development: The Case of Italy
KTHC 15.2006  Fabio SABATINI: The Empirics of Social Capital and Economic Development: A Critical Perspective 







(lxxviii) This paper was presented at the Second International Conference on "Tourism and Sustainable 
Economic Development - Macro and Micro Economic Issues" jointly organised by CRENoS (Università 
di Cagliari and Sassari, Italy) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy, and supported by the World Bank, 





  2006 SERIES 
  CCMP  Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti ) 
  SIEV  Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anna Alberini) 
  NRM  Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi) 
  KTHC  Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano) 
  IEM  International Energy Markets (Editor: Anil Markandya) 
  CSRM  Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Management (Editor: Sabina Ratti) 
  PRCG  Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti) 
  ETA  Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  CTN  Coalition Theory Network 
 